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Réservation Wages in 
Canadian Labour Markets 
Abrar Hasan 
and 
Surendra Géra 
Job search theory has been offered in récent years as one ex-
planation of unemployment. A key élément ofthe theory requires 
that workers behave as if they operate on a réservation wage 
strategy. The authors verify this hypothesis. 
Récent theoretical developments hâve emphasized the voluntary nature 
of unemployment1. One paradigm, that of search theory, uses imperfec-
tions in the labour markets to argue that search for labour market informa-
tion constitutes a productive activity2. Individuals can increase their utility, 
income or wealth by engaging in search unemployment if the returns to 
search are positive. This argument has been used as an explanation of both 
the incidence (frequency) of unemployment spells and their duration. Some 
search theorists go so far as to suggest that ail unemployment is voluntary in 
nature3. In addition to this extrême view, the search theoretic approach to 
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1 This view is best exemplified by various contributions in PHELPS, E.S., (éd.), Micro-
economic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, W.W. Norton, New York, 1970. 
2 Much of this work stems from the séminal articles by STIGLER, George J., "The 
Economies of Information", Journal of Potitical Economy, Vol. 69, No. 3, June 1961, pp. 
213-225, and "Information in the Labour Market", Journal of Political Economy, Part II, 
Vol. 70, No. 5, October 1962, pp. 94-105. 
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unemployment itself has corne in for serious criticism4. How much of the 
unemployment is attributable to productive search activity is a matter of 
considérable theoretical as well as policy importance and the debate cannot 
be resolved on purely theoretical grounds. Yet only limited empirical work 
is available in literature and none pertains to Canada. 
According to the search theory, once unemployed, an individual tailors 
his duration of unemployment in accordance with the marginal calculus of 
expected returns and expected costs of additional search. The resulting 
duration of unemployment, although optimal for the individual, also repre-
sents costs both to the individual and to the society. What amount of search 
is optimal for an individual becomes an important policy issue because the 
distribution of benefits and costs from search between the individual and 
the society is affected by government action. Search costs to the individual 
and the society are affected by government action. Search costs to the indi-
vidual are lowered by a number of government programs, such as unem-
ployment insurance, mobility grants, training, placement services, etc. For 
a large percentage of the unemployed individuals, especially those at the 
lower end of the wage spectrum, UI payments replace a large fraction of 
their normal wages. This heavy subsidization of search costs has two ef-
fects: on the one hand, it induces individuals into unemployment and 
lengthens their duration of search; on the other hand, better job matching 
may resuit in less fréquent spells of unemployment. The net effect of thèse 
two forces on the rate of (frictional) unemployment is an empirical issue. 
The questions then arise as to the amount of investment a society should 
make in the provision of labour market information as opposed to invest-
ment in training, mobility and job création; and what form this subsidiza-
tion should take. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER 
In this paper we investigate the wage-setting behaviour of individuals 
— or how workers frame their wage demands in the face of économie sti-
muli. In the language of search theory, this translates into the question 
whether unemployed individuals behave as if they employ a reservation-
wage (RW) strategy, which involves equating the marginal cost and returns 
of extra search. The primary objective of this paper is to examine whether 
4 Most of thèse criticisms were first voiced by TOBIN, J., "Inflation and Unemploy-
ment", American Economie Review, Vol. 62, No. 1, June 1972, pp. 1-18. See also GORDON, 
Robert J., "The Welfare Cost of Higher Unemployment", Brookings Paper on Economie Ac-
tivity, 1973, No. 1, pp. 133-195. 
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jobseekers behave as if they employ a RW strategy. Since the search theory 
attempts to portray voluntary behaviour of jobseekers, we test this theory 
with the help of data on unemployment spells which began as a resuit of 
voluntary quit décisions on the part of jobseekers. 
A second objective of this paper is to détermine how flexible RW is 
over the period of unemployment. An inflexible RW implies that jobseekers 
do not see fit to moderate their wage demands as the duration of unemploy-
ment increases. Rigidity in wage demands has been recognized, since the 
days of classical economists, as a major factor causing unemployment. In 
récent years, social assistance programs hâve been criticized for their contri-
bution to inflexibiliby in workers' wage demands5. Some empirical évidence 
is available, to suggest that réservation wages fall as unemployment is pro-
longed. However, most of this work is not rooted in search theoretic 
methodology6. 
Moreover, limitations of data hâve prevented most of the empirical 
work from considering the effect of a number of key labour market charac-
teristics which are known to be important déterminants of wage flexibility. 
In récent years, théories of dual labour markets and market segmentation 
hâve been put forth and, although much work remains to be done on theo-
retical level, the existence of différent labour markets, with only weak 
mobility among them, is widely accepted. The "new unemployment" litera-
ture, for example, has emphasized that for major groups of unemployed in-
dividuals the available jobs are neither appealing in themselves nor reward-
ing as pathways to better jobs in future7. The behaviour of RW for thèse in-
dividuals could be différent from individuals who form part of what is 
described as the primary labour market8. In this paper, the wage-setting 
behaviour of low-wage workers is examined separately from the high-wage 
workers and unionized workers are isolated from the non-unionized. De-
mand conditions in the labour markets is another factor which is explicitly 
introduced — it is hypothesized that workers* expectations would vary with 
différent demand conditions and further that workers would differ among 
themselves in the perception of market conditions. 
5 FELDSTEIN, M.S., "Lowering the Permanent Rate of Unemployment", Joint Eco-
nomie Committee, (Washington, Government Printing Office), 1973. 
6 MALHOTRA, Suresh, "Job Search Behaviour: An Empirical Analysis of Unemploy-
ment Duration", Ph.D Dissertation, University of Washington, 1976. 
7 FELDSTEIN, M.S., "The Economies of New Unemployment", The Public Interest, 
No. 33, Fall 1973, pp. 3-42. 
8 DOERINGER, Peter and PIORE, Michael, Internai Labor Markets and Manpower 
Analysis, Lexington (Mass.) Heath, 1971. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND ESTIMATION MODEL 
In order to maximize the benefits from search, an individual jobseeker 
must décide when to stop searching. Standard search models purport to 
show that this maximization of income (utility or wealth) problem can be 
solved by setting up a réservation wage (RW) such that wage offers (W) 
below the RW are rejected while any offer equal to or above the RW is ac-
cepted: 
W _> RW accept any offer 
W < RW reject ail offers (1) 
The RW itself is obtained by equating the marginal (expected) gain to the 
marginal (expected) cost of search. The marginal gain is derived from the 
wage offer distribution F(W), which is assumed to be known to the search-
er, is given exogenously and is stationary. The F(W) depicts the mean and 
the standard déviation of the distribution of possible wage offers facing the 
individual. The individual is also assumed to know the cost of search, which 
consists of two éléments: earnings foregone during the period of search 
represent the indirect élément while costs of filing applications, transporta-
tion, etc., represent the direct cost of search. Both the marginal gain and 
marginal cost are viewed net of the discount factor. RW in the functional 
form can be specified as: 
RW = f(F(W),C) (2) 
The underlying search theoretic hypothèses are that the RW will adjust up-
ward as search costs fall, as the expected value of wage offer rises, or as the 
dispersion in the wage offer distribution increases. 
Unfortunately équation (2) cannot be estimated directly because the 
RW is not itself observable. However, the wage offer W t actually accepted 
in period t is known. Since the restriction W _> RW is placed on Wj- then, in 
principle, it should be possible to approximate the RW9. To pursue this ap-
proach, let us assume that the expected value of wage offers facing an indi-
vidual i at time t is: 
E(Wit) = Xjt/Î (3) 
where, for each individual i, E(W) is the expected value of wage offer ac-
cepted at time t, X ' is a vector of searcher's productivity characteristics and 
labour market conditions. 
9 KIEFER, Nicholas M. and NEUMANN, George R., "An Empirical Job Search 
Model, With a Test of the Constant Reservation-Wage Hypothesis", Journal of Political Eco-
nomy, Vol. 87, No. 11, 1979, 87(1), pp. 89-107. 
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Let the RW function be given as 
RWit = ZJt7 + ej* ( 4 ) 
with e{| i.i.d.N(0, ofc). The vector Z{ (t) contains the worker and labour 
market characteristics. From (2) and (3) we hâve 
E(RWit) = f(x:t/3, C) = Z,> (5) 
Equation (5) would require, then, that ail éléments of X'be contained in Z . 
Now, in order to provide identification, it is necessary that some éléments 
of X ' affect réservation wages solely through their effects on wage offers. 
For this reason we define 
Xit = (X{„ X#) (6) 
and Zit = (X]t, X?t, x£) (7) 
where XJ's are those variables which enter in the détermination of F(W) but 
not in the détermination of C; XJc's affect both F(W) and C; and Xc,s are 
éléments of C but not of F(W). 
In view of thèse considérations we can use observations on wage offers 
actually accepted to estimate the RW function. We do this in two steps. 
First, a wage offer function, Wj, is estimated, in which the arguments are 
XJ and XJC: 
Wj = g(XJ, X{c) (8) 
where Wj's is the wage offer accepted by individual i in the sample. The se-
cond stage would then consist of the estimation: 
RW; = h(Wi, X{c, X?) (9) 
where WJ'S are estimated values from équation (8) and X]c Xf retain their 
previous désignation. 
Réservation Wages and Duration of Unemployment 
We now proceed one step further and inquire how individuals adjust their 
wage setting behaviour, i.e., their réservation wages, as the duration of 
search (unemployment) lengthens. Do individuals increase, reduce or keep 
their réservation wages constant over the duration of search? 
Any one of thèse three options are theoretically feasible under différent 
sets of assumptions. For example, if, as the resuit of search, an individual 
discovers that the wage offer distribution has a higher mean than expected, 
then the RW will rise. This possibility has been suggested by Sant (1977). 
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RW would be constant under the assumption of infinité horizon, knowledge 
of wage offer distribution, and lack of capital constraints. Declining réser-
vation wages may arise if a finite time horizon assumption is introduced. 
Thus the issue is clearly an empirical one. 
In order to examine this issue we introduce, in équation (5), the dura-
tion of search (D) as a catch-ail term to capture the effect of duration of 
unemployment in équation. This équation now becomes: 
E(RWjt) = Zjtr + g-D„ (10) 
Estimation Equations 
From the foregoing discussion we can now dérive the équations which 
are suitable for estimation. Thèse équations may be written as: 
Wage Offer Function 
loSW< = Z»mxJm + £»pXJp + e*
 ( 1 1 ) 
Constant Réservation Wage Function 
logRWt = bjw + SbpX{,c + XbqXcq + eR (12) 
Variable Réservation Wage Function 
log RWt = b,w + Zbpx{,c + ZbqX< + g-D( + eR ( 1 3 ) 
where log Wt and log RWt = logarithm of the real (in 1971 dollars) week-
ly wages 
XJm = variables which are déterminants of wage 
offer distribution only 
XJpc = variables which are déterminants of wage 
offers as well as cost of the search 
Xq = variables which détermine cost of search 
only 
Dt = duration of search 
a, b = coefficients, and 
ew, eR = disturbance terms. 
Consider now the déterminants of wage offers in équation (11)10. The 
io A complète list of ail the variables and their définitions is provided in Appendix A-l. 
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log of real weekly wages in time t is used as the dépendent variable11. The 
subsets identified by XJ, and XJC include ail the variables which affect the 
wage offer function but exclude Xe i.e., variables which affect cost of 
search only. The wage offer distribution that an individual faces may be 
said to dépend on: (a) state of the labour market and (b) human capital 
characteristics of the individual. 
The labour market conditions are captured by a set of dummy vari-
ables, PROVINCE, denoting the province in which the jobseeker is located. 
It is assumed that, on balance a tighter labour market would imply higher 
wage offer s relative to slack markets. Due to the differing nature of the 
structural and seasonal patterns of the economy across the provinces, we do 
not assign any expectations for the sign of the coefficients relative to the 
omitted province, British Columbia. The dummies are used as control vari-
ables to capture locational différences. 
Consider now the variables INDUSTRY, OCCUPATION, and 
UNIONIZATION. Thèse variables provide an indication of labour markets 
in that the mean wage values differ by industry, occupation and union. 
However, thèse same variables also influence productivity characteristics of 
an individual. Similar reasoning suggests that searching over différent in-
dustries, FLXINDUS, or over différent occupations, FLXOCCUP, would 
be an élément in determining wage offers. By broadening the market being 
searched FLXINDUS is likely to be positively associated with wage offers. 
FLXOCCUP, on the other hand, may exert a négative effect since transfer 
of human capital from one occupation to another may be costly. 
An individual's market productivity characteristics are captured by a 
number of variables such as EDUCATION, TRAINING, AGE, REASON-
QUIT (reason for job leaving) and PRE-WAGE (past wages). The relevance 
of the first three is obvious. EDUCATION is likely to be positively associ-
ated with wage offers, as would be the case with TRAINING and AGE. 
There may be some non-linearities in AGE which are captured in the model 
by introducing (AGE^). To account for causal interaction between âge and 
éducation a term AGE x EDUCATION is introduced. One indicator of a 
person's labour market productivity is his past wages (PRE-WAGE). It is 
likely to be positively correlated with the post-unemployment wages12. 
11 The logarithmic form of the function is preferred for empirical estimation purposes 
for several reasons. The log form yields better statistical fits than unlog form, and the distribu-
tion of log of wages is less skewed than the distribution of actual wages. 
12 See WELCH, Finis, "What Hâve We Learned from Empirical Studies of Unemploy-
ment Insurance", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 30(4), July 1977, pp. 451-461. 
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REASONQUIT needs a word of explanation. Our data permit differ-
entiation among four types of quits: quitting for family reasons, job dissa-
tisfaction, return to school and others. The last category is omitted in a 
dummy variable set up. The hypothesis is that job dissatisfaction would in-
dicate a positive corrélation with wage offers as compared with the omitted 
category, whereas job leaving for family reasons would exert a négative 
impact. 
Finally, three variables are introduced as controls. Whether an individ-
ual is willing to accept a pay eut (FLXWAGE) is a signal to the employers. 
This willingness should hâve a négative impact on wage offers. On-the-job 
search (ONSEARCH) is another variable of interest, and one that has been 
neglected in the search literature. In our sample, some individuals quit after 
beginning their search on the job while others quit first and then search. We 
hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, those who hâve searched on the job 
should be better informed about the job market and are therefore likely to 
exert a positive influence on expected wage offers. Tenure on the last job 
(JOBTENURE) is another control variable. It is assumed that longer tenure 
is likely to send a positive signal to the employer thereby improving the 
value of wage offers. 
Equation (12) and (13) estimate the constant and declining réservation 
wage models. The variables of primary interest are the ones which enter Xe , 
i.e., variables which affect costs but not wage offers, and w, the expected 
value of wage offers estimated from équation (11). Other variables enter as 
part of XJC and hâve already been described above. 
Variables in the Xe set measure the financial burden unemployment is 
likely to impose on an individual. The variable MARITAL controls for the 
marital status of jobseeker and has an ambiguous sign on a priori basis as 
présence of a spouse does not imply présence of a dépendent. The variable 
FAMILY SIZE provides a more direct indication of financial responsibili-
ties and has been used as a proxy for discount rates. Given the size of assets 
searchers with larger families are expected to discount returns from search 
at a higher rate13. An individual who has a part-time job during unemploy-
ment (FLXPART) can afford to wait longer and therefore set up a higher 
réservation wage. FLXPART is included to capture this phenomenon. Non-
wage income can take a number of forms, income from spouse 
(SPOUSEY), savings (SAVINGS), and other income sources (OTHERY). 
Each of thèse should hâve a positive impact on RW. Ideally, it is the ex-
13 See SCHMIDT, Ronald W., The Déterminants of Search Behaviour and the Value of 
Additional Unemployment, Working Paper Séries No. 7429, Graduate School of Manage-
ment, University of Rochester, September 1974. 
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pected value of SPOUSEY and OTHERY that matter. However, in the ab-
sence of such data we use the actual values. Tenure on the next job 
(NXEMP) is another variable of some interest. The longer an individual ex-
perts to work on the next job the more cautious he will be in setting up his 
réservation wages. One adjustment to not finding a job is to lower one's ex-
pectations regarding the relative permanence of next job (Stephenson, 
1976). An unemployed individual having spent some time in job search 
may, as a stop-gap measure, lower his RW and accept a low-pay job, and 
compensate for it by reducing the expected tenure. 
THE DATA 
Our data are drawn from the 1978 Labour Force Tracking Survey 
developed by Canada Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce. This 
Survey covers individuals from selected communities who were laid off or 
who voluntarily left their jobs as a resuit of a plant shutdown or a cutback 
in production. Survey teams gathered the list of such individuals from spé-
cifie employers within designated localities and an attempt was made to 
contact each individual on the list. From the individuals contacted informa-
tion was sought concerning their employment/unemployment records for 
the last five years, from 1973 to the cutoff date in summer 1978. The data 
relate to ail completed unemployment épisodes, single or multiple, as the 
case may be. Each épisode contains information on pre- and post-
unemployment wages, selected personal and human capital characteristics 
and motivational and financial attributes of the individual and some char-
acteristics of the household to which he/she belongs. The sample is further 
restricted to unemployment épisodes which began when individuals quit 
their job. When the data for ail the years are pooled together, the total sam-
ple consists of 2,852 observations out of which 1,975 relate to maie workers 
and 877 to female. Sample means are given in Appendix A-2. 
Two limitations of the data should be noted. First, the sample based on 
plants experiencing major layoffs or shutdown may not, of course, be re-
présentative of Canadian work force. This limitation is mitigated somewhat 
by inclusion in the sample of unemployment /employment history of the 
past five years. A second limitation of the sample is that it is also potentially 
affected by the contact rate. Highly mobile individuals, especially those 
who move out of the communities surveyed, are likely to dominate the in-
dividuals who could not be contacted. 
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RESULTS AND THEIR DISCUSSION 
Wage Offer Function 
As a first step in estimating RW, the wage offer function using équa-
tion (11) is estimated and the results obtained are presented in Table 1. A 
large number of variables included in the équation are significant, especially 
for maies. A number of other researchers hâve estimated wage offer fonc-
tions14. However, our spécification incorporâtes certain novel features 
which deserve mention. FLXWAGE, the willingness to accept lower wages, 
is used as an explanatory variable. This variable could capture jobseekers' 
prior beliefs about the wage offer distribution. Search theory assumes that 
wage offers are exogenously given to individuals. This assumption is better 
approximated if we hold constant the influence any individual-market 
dynamics may hâve. Individuals willing to accept a wage eut do end up 
receiving lower wages, possibly by revealing their expectations. 
Wage flexibility is only one response to expectations regarding market 
opportunities. Another response could be to cast the net wider and extend 
search to other industries and occupations. FLXOCCUP, or search exten-
ding to other occupations in addition to one's own may, however, involve a 
loss from non-transferability of occupation-specific human capital. The 
négative coefficient we obtain for FLXOCCUP, on this interprétation, 
could measure the loss of human capital involved in embarking on a new oc-
cupation. FLXINDUS, on the other hand, representing search in other in-
dustries need not entail such a loss. In fact, by adding to the variability of 
wage offers, searching among more industries than one, should hâve a posi-
tive effect on wage offers, as we observe to be the case for maies. 
One-the-job search (ONSEARCH) is a much neglected aspect of 
labour market search behaviour. In an earlier work we hâve provided évi-
dence on the magnitude and pervasiveness of this phenomenon in Canadian 
labour markets15. In the wage offer function we find ONSEARCH to be 
positively related to wage offers. Individuals who search on-the-job prior to 
becoming unemployed receive, on average, higher post-unemployment 
wages than those individuals who do not search while employed. Specifical-
14 See HALL, Robert, "Wages, Income and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labour Force", 
in WATTS and CAIN, (eds.), Income Maintenance and Labour Supply, Econometric Studies, 
Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1973, KAHN, Lawrence 
M., "The Returns to Job Search: A Test of Two Models", Review of Economies and Statis-
tics, 40(4), November 1978, pp. 486-503 and KIEFER and NEUMANN, 1979, op. cit. 
15 HASAN, A. and GERA, S., Aspects of Job Search in Canada, Discussion Paper No. 
156, Economie Council of Canada, March 1980. 
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TABLE 1 
Wage Offer Function (OLS Estimâtes) 
(Standard errors in parenthèses) 
MALES FEMALES 
Constant -0.760 -0.866 
EDUCATION 0.006** 0.010* 
(0.003) (0.006) 
TRAINING 0.012*** 0.003 
(0.002) (0.007) 
AGE 0.011*** 0.008** 
(0.002) (0.004) 
AGE (SQUARED) -0.001*** -0.00006 
(0.00003) (0.00004) 
AGE x EDUCATION -0.0002** -0.0003 
(0.0001) (0.0002) 
UNIONIZED 0.016** -0.010 
(0.007) (0.012) 
JOBTENURE -0.00001 -0.000009 
(0.00001) (0.00003) 
REASONQUIT 1 0.017** 0.001 
(0.007) (0.010) 
REASONQUIT 2 -0.056 0.018 
(0.044) (0.141) 
REASONQUIT 3 0.041*** -0.059 
(0.016) (0.036) 
ONSEARCH 0.034*** 0.025** 
(0.007) (0.011) 
FLXWAGE -0.032*** -0.008 
(0.006) (0.011) 
FLXINDUS 0.032*** -0.016 
(0.012) (0.020) 
FLXOCCUP -0.007*** 0.003 
(0.012) (0.020) 
LOG PRE-WAGE 0.301*** 0.328*** 
(0.021) (0.038) 
OCCUPA TION 
Managerial -0.006 0.065 
(0.021) (0.038) 
Clérical -0.006 0.029 
(0.020) (0.030) 
Sales & Services -0.023 0.046 
(0.018) (0.032) 
Primary 0.056*** -0.075 
(0.019) (0.070) 
Processing -0.019 0.013 
(0.017) (0.029) 
Machining 0.013 0.078** 
(0.019) (0.033) 
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TABLE 1 (Cont'd) 
MALES EEMALES 
Fabricating -0.013 0.006 
(0.017) (0.028) 
Construction -0.006 0.017 
(0.019) (0.054) 
Transportation 0.011 0.026 
(0.018) (0.038) 
INDUSTRY 
Manufacturing 0.005 0.012 
(0.010) (0.020) 
Construction 0.061*** 0.064 
(0.015) (0.075) 
Transportation -0.006 -0.085 
(0.017) (0.060) 
Trade & Finance 0.029** -0.008 
(0.013) (0.019) 
PROVINCE 
Newfoundland -0.076*** 0.017 
(0.022) (0.143) 
New Brunswick -0.109*** -0.114*** 
(0.022) (0.037) 
Québec -0.082*** -0.109*** 
(0.012) (0.030) 
Ontario -0.055*** -0.044 
(0.014) (0.030) 
Manitoba -0.062*** -0.096*** 
(0.020) 
.34 
(0.046) 
~2 0.27 
R2 .33 0.24 
No. of Observations 1975 877 
* Significant at 10 per cent level (two-tail test). 
** Significant at 5 per cent level (two-tail test). 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level (two-tail test). 
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ly, on-the-job search contributed to 3.4 per cent higher wage for maies and 
2.5 per cent for females. 
Other interesting results from Table 1 may be noted parenthetically. 
The contribution of éducation is positive as expected and the coefficient at-
tains statistical significance, more so for maies. Years of training are signifi-
cant only for maies. Their insignificance for females may arise partly from 
their low levels for females (see Appendix A-2) and partly from the nature 
of secondary labour markets where women predominate. Labour market 
conditions denoted by the set of provincial dummies are highly significant, 
especially for maies. One surprising resuit that défies easy explanation is 
that occupational dummies do not attain statistical significance. 
Constant Réservation Wage Function 
Using the estimated values from the wage offer function, the constant 
RW model is estimated and the results are presented in Table 2 for maies 
and females in columns (1) and (3) respectively. In the présent context the 
variables of primary interest are the ones which enter Xe , i.e., variables 
which affect costs but not wage offers, and w the expected value of wage of-
fers. The search theoretic hypothesis is that w should be positively related to 
the réservation wage while anything that raises cost of search should hâve a 
négative sign. 
The results presented in Table 2 support search-theoretic expectations. 
The expected wage variable, w, exerts a highly significant effect on réserva-
tion wages and as expected, its impact is positive. As explained earlier, the 
cost side is captured by a number of variables representing financial burden 
imposed by unemployment. Almost ail the variables operate in the expected 
direction. Being married serves to raise the RW for maies, as it does for the 
females but for the latter the relationship is not significant. FAMILY SIZE 
(per earner) also has a positive impact and, in this instance, the relationship 
is significant for females but not for maies. An individual who has a part-
time job during unemployment (FLXPART) can afford to wait longer and 
set up a higher réservation wage. This is supported by the positive coeffi-
cient for FLXPART. Non-wage income can take a number of forms: in-
come from spouse (SPOUSEY), savings (SAVINGS), and other income 
sources (OTHERY). Each of thèse should hâve a positive impact on RW. 
Our results indicate that the availability of savings raises the RW for maies 
but in the case of women the relationship is insignificant. For females this 
effect is perhaps captured by the variable "other income" (OTHERY) 
which is statistically significant and has a positive impact on RW. Finally, 
we find a positive relationship between RW and tenure as expected. 
TABLE 2 
Constant Versus Variable Réservation Wage Models 
OLS Estimâtes 
(Standard Error in Parenthèses) 
Maies Females 
Constant Variable Constant Variable 
Réservation Wage Réservation Wage Réservation Wage Réservation l 
Function Function Function Function 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 
EDUCATION 
TRAINING 
AGE 
AGE (SQUARED) 
AGE x EDUCATION 
UNIONIZED 
REASONQUIT 1 
REASONQUIT 2 
REASONQUIT 3 
ONSEARCH 
-.018 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
.00001 
(.00003) 
.00009 
(.00011) 
-.008 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
.002 
(.042) 
-.012 
(.016) 
.0006 
(.007) 
.025 
-.004 
(.003) 
.0004 
(.002) 
-.002 
(.003) 
.00001 
(.00003) 
.00009 
(.0001) 
-.007 
(.006) 
-.004 
(.006) 
.003 
(.042) 
-.012 
(.016) 
.001 
(.007) 
-.06 
-.0007 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.007) 
.002 
(.004) 
-.00003 
(.00005) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
-.006 
(.009) 
.007 
(.009) 
-.098 
(.135) 
-026 
(.034) 
.0009 
(.011) 
-.045 
-.0009 
(.006) 
-.005 
(.007) 
.001 
(.004) 
-.00003 
(.00005) 
.0001 
(.0002) 
-.001 
(.009) 
.004 
(.009) 
-.097 
(.135) 
-,028 
(.034) 
-.000009 
(.010) 
TABLE 2 (Cont'd) 
Maies 
FLXWAGE 
FLXINDUS 
FLXOCCUP 
PROVINCES 
Newfoundland 
New Brunswick 
Québec 
Ontario 
Manitoba 
MARITAL 
FLXPART 
FAMILY SIZE 
SPOUSEY 
Constant Variable 
rvation Wage Réservation Wage 
Function Function 
(1) (2) 
.004 .004 
(.006) (.006) 
.003 .003 
(.012) (.012) 
-.003 -.003 
(.012) (.012) 
-.005 .010 
(.022) (.022) 
-.017 .015 
(.022) (.022) 
-.014 .011 
(.013) (.013) 
-.004 .003 
(.014) (.014) 
-.008 .009 
(.006) (.020) 
.015* .014* 
(.008) (.008) 
.013 .016 
(.011) (.011) 
.0005 .0002 
(.003) (.003) 
.0003 .0007 
(.010) (.010) 
Females 
Constant Variable 
Réservation Wage Réservation Wage 
Function Function 
(3) (4) 
.004 .002 
(.010) (.010) 
-.002 -.0008 
(.018) (.018) 
.011 .010 
(.018) (.018) 
-.090 -.090 
(.138) (.ne) 
-.020 -.011 
(.037) (.040) 
-.030 -.027 
(.029) (.030) 
-.041 -.035 
(.027) (.027) 
-.021 -.025 
(.050) (.045) 
.0001 .0001 
(.014) (.014) 
.014 .0180 
(.017) (.020) 
.009*** .009*** 
(.003) (.003) 
-.022 -.018 
(.013) (.013) 
TABLE 2 (Cont'd) 
Maies 
SAVINGS 
OTHERY 
NXEMP 
No. of Observations 
Constant Variable 
vvalion Wage Réservation Wage 
Function Function 
(I) (2) 
.018*** .018*** 
(.007) (.007) 
-.015 -.013 
(.011) (.011) 
.0005*** .0005*** 
(.00007) (.00007) 
.972*** .966*** 
(.046) (.046) 
-.0003*** 
(.0001) 
.37 .37 
.36 .36 
1975 1975 
* Significant at 10 per cent level (two-tail test) 
* Significant at 1 per cent level (two-tail test). 
Females 
Constant Variable 
Réservation Wage Réservation Wage 
Function Function 
.001 .003 
(.010) (.010) 
.021 .021 
(.016) (.016) 
.0005*** .0005*** 
(.0001) (.0001) 
.824*** .823*** 
(.080) (.080) 
-.0003*** 
(.0001) 
.29 .30 
.27 .28 
877 877 
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It will be noticed that a number of other variables do not attain statis-
tical significance in the RW équation but are retained as controls. Variables 
like AGE, TRAINING and EDUCATION, for example, are significant in 
wage offer équation but not in the réservation wage function. It would ap-
pear that they affect RW through their impact on wage expectations, w, 
rather than directly. In conclusion, the key point to note is that both wage 
expectations (w) and several variables representing cost side are statistically 
significant. 
Réservation Wages and Duration of Unemployment 
We now turn to the issue of flexibility of RW with respect to the dura-
tion of unemployment. Estimated coefficients for this model are presented 
in Table 2 for maies and females in columns (2) and (4) respectively. Thèse 
results are examined in relation to the constant réservation wage model (col-
umns (1) and (3)). Most of the coefficients exhibit little change between the 
two models. In other words, inclusion of the duration variable does not af-
fect the stability of other coefficients, which provides support to our spéci-
fication. Our results suggest that réservation wage déclines .03 per cent per 
week (in real terms) for both maies and females. This translates into a 
monthly décline of . 12 per cent. If the RW was $120 (in real terms) per week 
at the start of the search period then it would décline (for an average dura-
tion of 24 weeks) by .72 per cent or approximately $1, clearly a very small 
décline. Thus even though the RW is flexible, this flexibility is extremely 
small in our sample and, as we explain below, it may be due to the high 
floor set by income replacement measures. 
Empirical research has, by and large, supported the notion of RW 
declining with the length of unemployment. However, a wide variety of 
results hâve been reported. Stephenson (1976) found a décline of 0.06 per 
month compared with 0.38 reported by Kasper (1967), 1.25 Fishman, et al. 
(1968) and 2.38 for Barnes (1975)16. For a variety of reasons, thèse results 
are not comparable to ours. First, excepting Stephenson, the définition of 
réservation wage used by thèse authors is not the concept implied by the 
search hypothesis. Second, Kasper, Barnes and Fishman, et al., do not con-
trol for many of the économie and démographie factors which are known to 
affect the cost and returns of search. 
16 W.F. BARNES provides three estimâtes for the first, second and the third month. The 
figure quoted hère refers to the second month. See BARNES, W.F., "Job Search Models, the 
Duration of Unemployment and the Asking Wage: Some Empirical Evidence", The Journal of 
Human Resources, 10(2), Spring 1975, pp. 230-240. 
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Stephenson uses the desired concept of a certain wage below which an 
offer will be rejected, the concept which is also employed by Kiefer and 
Neumann and in this study. The very low estimate of 0.06 per cent décline 
per month obtained by Stephenson may be partly due to the fact that his 
sample of youths is least likely to include individuals with largest relative 
décline. Our results show that when controlled for other factors RW dé-
clines with âge. Although this fact says nothing about the rate of décline 
over the length of unemployment our presumption is that youths hâve a 
lower rate of décline as well. Corroborative évidence to this effect is includ-
ed later in this paper. 
Kiefer and Neumann arrive at a rate of décline of 2.5 per cent per 
month and in comparison our results are considerably lower. A number of 
reasons explain this disparity. First, our sample is limited to quits. Thèse in-
dividuals are likely to be better aware of the labour markets, and must take 
a calculated risk in leaving their jobs. Consequently their asking wage is 
likely to decrease less than that of other workers. Other sample différences 
are also noteworthy. Kiefer and Neumann do not use longitudinal data. 
Rather, duration of unemployment whether complète or not at a given time 
are included by them. A second reason may be found in the différences in 
the UI program applicable in the two samples. Our sample spans a five year 
period (1973-78) during which time some modifications in the benefit struc-
ture and eligibility conditions were introduced. Although UI provisions in 
the U.S. vary by state, it is by and large true that the Canadian UI System 
has eligibility requirements that are less stringent and more universal than is 
the case in the U.S. The benefit rate in Canada is generally higher and the 
benefit duration entitlement longer. Similarly the treatment accorded the 
quits is more generous. Consequently the effective value of income replace-
ment through UI is likely to be a larger fraction in the Canadian case, which 
suggests a lower rate of décline in réservation wages compared with the U.S. 
situation. Third, there are a number of ways in which our spécification is 
différent from Kiefer and Neumann. In particular we allow for non-wage 
adjustment, part-time work and types of quitting. 
The major conclusion to émerge from the above is that individuals do 
respond to wage expectations and to costs of unemployment. They appear 
to balance thèse factors in a way which suggests that they are following a 
réservation wages strategy. Hence a portion of variation in the unemploy-
ment duration is explained by search-theoretic considérations, i.e., an em-
ployment opportunity is accepted only if it is optimal. Employment-
acceptance friction, therefore, is an important part of the observed unem-
ployment. 
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Thèse conclusions hold for both maies and females. The fact that our 
sample is drawn from communities where major layoffs had occurred 
strengthens the importance of our conclusion: support for search-theoretic 
explanations in markets where average duration of unemployment is high 
(24 weeks for maies and 35 for females) is reassuring. This length of unem-
ployment is not usually considered to be of the frictional variety. 
Impact of Labour Markets and Demand Conditions 
Underlying the empirical results presented above is the assumption 
that, except for the factors explicitly held constant in the régression équa-
tions, the individuals in the sample are statistically équivalent in the sensé 
that they are sampling from a given wage offer distribution and facing simi-
lar cost conditions. The validity of this assumption is greater the more 
homogeneous the sample. If we could construct more homogeneous sub-
samples from our data we may find that the observed décline in RW may 
differ among them. 
One classification of workers is according to the labour market in 
which they operate. While the théories of dual labour market and market 
segmentation hâve not received unqualified acceptance as theoretical para-
digms, the notion is commonly accepted that there do exist widely différent 
labour markets among which the mobility of labour is severely restricted. It 
is believed by many that low-wage workers move from one dead-end job to 
another without much hope for an earnings improvement17. This suggests 
that wage dispersion for low-wage workers may be small. The impact of 
social législations, such as the minimum wages is to truncate the lower end 
of wage distribution. The more important effect of thèse législations, how-
ever, is to set lower limits on the cost of undertaking (unemployed) job 
search. UI benefits, for instance, provide such a floor. The point to note is 
that the impact of UI is not the same for low and high-wage workers. The 
ceiling on the maximum insurable earnings means that the effective replace-
ment ratio is lower as wage levels exceed this ceiling. Thèse considérations 
suggest that both on the demand side (wage dispersions) and on the cost side 
(cost of searching) there are significant différences between high and low-
wage workers. Hence the behaviour of RW over duration of search will ex-
hibit différences for thèse groups. As an extrême case, workers at the 
minimum wage cannot, obviously, lower their asking wages below that 
floor. 
n FELDSTEIN, M.S., "Lowering the.. .", op. cit. 
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Unionization provides another delimiting criterion among différent 
markets. A labour market where workers are organized may differ signifi-
cantly from a non-unionized labour market. Part of the différences may be 
in terms of wage levels and structure, and product markets may also vary. 
For thèse reasons the search strategy employed by a union worker may dif-
fer from the non-unionized individuals. Some unionized workers may hâve 
the call back to work rights and others may not. The behaviour of thèse two 
groups may be différent18. However, our sample is restricted to quits only 
and our results will not therefore be affected by this distinction. 
A third feature along which labour markets may be distinguished is 
provided by demand conditions. The mean of wage offer distribution is 
likely to vary with cyclical changes, increasing under buoyant conditions 
and decreasing when demand is slacking off. To the extent that individuals 
do not foresee perfectly the expected changes in market demand conditions 
their observed RW behaviour will be affected. Moreover, risk averse indi-
viduals are likely to respond in manners différent from risk-lovers. The for-
mer group will exhibit greater flexibility in RW. 
The impact of thèse three labour market features is examined on the 
flexibility of RW and the results are reported in Table 3. We segregate the 
total sample into différent wage groups, into union-non-union catégories 
and by différent rates of unemployment at the start of the unemployment 
spell. 
Looking at panel A we observe that low-wage workers, whether maie 
or female, tend to exhibit less flexibility in wage demands compared with 
the higher wage groups. There are a number of interrelated reasons why 
high-wage workers are likely to exhibit greater RW flexibility. First,, UI and 
other social compensations to high-wage workers leave uncompensated a 
larger part of wage income than is the case for low-wage workers. Second, 
the rate of dépréciation of human capital is likely to be larger for high-wage 
earners. Third, since the low-wage earners are concentrated in the secon-
dary labour market their wage expectations are not high to begin with. 
Thèse expectations are, therefore, unlikely to be much modified by increas-
ing duration of unemployment. Finally, low-wage workers at or near the 
minimum wage hâve little room to exhibit a décline in their wage demands. 
In panel B, unionized workers exhibit a greater décline in réservation 
wages than do non-unionized individuals. A number of explanations sug-
gest themselves. Clearly, the behaviour of réservation wages of unionized 
unemployed workers is quite a différent issue than the behaviour of wages 
18 The authors are thankful to the editors for suggesting this point. 
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of unionized employed individuals. Rigidity in the wage demands for the 
latter does not imply similar behaviour for the former group. The greater 
flexibility in RW of unionized workers reported in panel B can be explained 
by factors operating on the demand as well as on the supply side of the mar-
ket. Consider the supply side first: non-union workers are low-paid relative 
to the unionized workers; in our sample the différence is about 20 per cent. 
We hâve seen above that, for the reasons already mentioned, low-paid 
workers exhibit a lower rate of décline. Both the minimum wage and UI 
payments act as a floor and there is less of a margin for the décline of asking 
wages. The demand side of the market may be reflected in the union pré-
férence function19. 
TABLE 3 
Percentage Change in RW (in Real Terms) Over an 
Additional Week of Duration of Unemployment by: 
A. Wage Groups 
Real Wage Maies Females 
$100 or less Insignificant - .04*** 
$101-150 - .06*** Insignificant 
$151 and up 
B. Unionization Status 
- .2*** 
Unionization Maies Females 
Unionized - .05*** - .04*** 
Non-Unionized Insignificant 
C. Unemployment Rates 
Insignificant 
U-rates Maies Females 
less than or 
equal to 7.0 - .04** Insignificant 
7.1 to8.0 - .05* Insignificant 
8.1 to9.0 Insignificant - .14*** 
9.0 - .07* - .17*** 
* Significant at the 10 per cent level 
** Significant at the 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
19 CARTTER, Allan M., Theory of Wages and Employment, Richard D. Irwin, 
Chicago, 1959. 
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A union can be an employment- or a wage-maximiser. For a wage max-
imizing union, those individuals who happen to be laid off get the worst of 
both the worlds. The union is unwilling or unable to help them find a job. 
Since, their pre-unemployment wages hâve been bid high, once unemploy-
ed, they hâve to reduce their asking wages that much more. This message 
sinks in as the duration of unemployment lengthens. This resuit is also in 
the spirit of the contract theory, which holds that worker-employer con-
tracts, implicit on the part of individual workers but explicit in the case of 
unions, tend to insure wage stability at the cost of fluctuations in em-
ployment. 
We now turn to panel C in Table 3 which reports the décline in RW ob-
tained for markets with différent rates of unemployment. In the absence of 
better proxies thèse rates are used as cyclical indicators. Search theory 
would suggest that the mean of wage offer distributions confronting indi-
viduals would improve with improving économie conditions, which would 
suggest higher réservation wages. However, to the extent that thèse fluctua-
tions are foreseen at the commencement of the search process they should 
hâve no effect on the réservation wages. Unanticipated changes in the wage-
offer distribution will, of course, lead to changes in RW. From our results it 
would appear that higher rates of unemployment at the start of the unem-
ployment spell causes risk-averse individuals to dominate the outeome. 
Alternatively, individuals could become more risk averse in slack markets. 
In either case, RW déclines more than it does in the case of low unemploy-
ment rates. The view seems widespread that wage demands are likely to be 
more flexible under recessionary conditions. We find support for this hypo-
thesis in Table 3. A week of unemployment leads to a greater décline in RW 
the higher the unemployment rate at the beginning of the process. This pro-
position holds most clearly for women and may signify a version of the add-
ed worker scénario: during cyclical recession women workers may be more 
flexible in wage demands because they wish to return to work speedily in 
order to augment family income. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has explored the dynamics of wage setting behaviour in 
Canadian labour markets. If search theoretic explanations provide a rea-
sonable expression of labour market realities, they are likely to be most évi-
dent in the case of job leavers. For this reason our sample was restricted to 
quit cases. 
Our results provide évidence of considérable dynamism in labour 
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market adjustment process. Unemployed workers are shown to be respon-
sive to wage expectations and costs related to job search. Their asking wages 
(réservation wages) are not set arbitrarily but respond to changing économie 
circumstances. They are positively related to wage expectations and de-
crease as the cost of unemployment increases. In responding to changing 
économie stimuli unemployed individuals behave in a way which is consis-
tent with optimizing behaviour. Consistent with this behaviour, they set 
their réservation wages and tailor their duration of unemployment to maxi-
mize benefits from search. 
We find, in addition, a number of other pointers to responsiveness of 
individuals to labour market conditions. Some 40 per cent of individuals in 
the sample express a willingness to accept a lower wage — a very high per-
centage indeed. Jobseekers exhibit other forms of (non-wage) flexibility as 
well. About 62 per cent of maies and 48 per cent of females looked for work 
in industries in addition to their own. A roughly comparable figure applies 
to searching in alternative occupations. Adding to indications of respon-
siveness is the average tenure with previous employers, which turns out to 
be only slightly longer than two years. We find also that close to one-third 
of the individuals in the sample engaged in search on the job and that on-
the-job search adds about 3 per cent to increases in post-unemployment 
wages. 
Of spécial interest is the flexibility exhibited by réservation wages as the 
duration of search increases. We find the RW to décline with lengthening 
duration. However, the average rate of décline for the sample is very small, 
only .12 per cent per month, and suggests that wage signais in the labour 
market work sluggishly. The small flexibility may be partly due to the high 
income replacement floor provided by the UI benefits. This argument is 
supported by the fact that high-wage workers exhibit a larger décline than 
the low-wage workers — the UI being a more important factor for the lat-
ter. The higher rate of décline for union workers relative to others can also 
be explained, in part, by the relatively higher wages of the former. Adding 
to the évidence on flexibility is the fact that réservation wages décline more 
when employment conditions worsen. Workers exhibit greater risk-
averseness under thèse conditions. 
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W t 
PRE-WAGE 
EDUCATION 
TRAINING 
INDUSTRY 
OCCUPATION 
UNIONIZED 
GPROGRAM 
PROVINCE 
AGE 
AGE (SQUARED) 
AGE x EDUCATION 
JOBTENURE 
REASONQUIT 1 
REASONQUIT 2 
REASONQUIT 3 
REASONQUIT 4 
ONSEARCH 
FLXWAGE 
FLXINDUS 
FLXOCCUP 
FLXPART 
APPENDIX A l 
List of Variables 
Real post-unemployment weekly wage rate ($1971). 
Real pre-unemployment weekly wage rate ($1971). 
Years of schooling. 
Years of training. 
A set of five dummy variables representing différent in-
dustries. The last category 'others' is omitted from régres-
sions. 
A set of ten dummy variables representing occupations. 
The last category 'others' is omitted from régressions. 
1 if union member 
0 otherwise. 
1 if participated in a government sponsored training, 
relocation or welfare program 
0 otherwise. 
A set of six dummy variables; British Columbia is the 
category omitted from régressions. 
Actual âge in years. 
Actual âge in years squared. 
Interaction variable. 
Duration of previous job (prior to the unemployment 
épisode). 
Quit job for reasons of job dissatisfaction. 
Retired with or without company pension. 
Returned to school/training. 
Other reasons such as fire, maternity, illness or injury, 
etc. 
Omitted from régressions. 
1 if looked for job before leaving last job 
0 otherwise. 
1 if willing to accept wages lower than at previous job 
0 otherwise. 
1 if searched for job both same as and other than previous 
0 otherwise. 
1 if searched for a job both same as and other than pre-
vious 
0 otherwise. 
1 if worked part time during the period looking for a job 
0 otherwise. 
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MARITAL 
FAMILY SIZE 
SAVINGS 
SPOUSEY 
OTHERY 
D 
NXEMP 
NLOOKED 
1 if married 
0 otherwise. 
Number of dependents divided by the number of earners 
in the family. 
1 if used own savings 
0 otherwise. 
1 if used spouse's income 
0 otherwise. 
1 if had other sources of income 
0 otherwise. 
Weeks looking for work. 
Weeks of employment in the next job. 
Weeks not looked for a job. 
APPENDIX A-2 
Summary of Sample Mean Values 
MALES FEMALES 
EDUCATION (years) 9.4 9.7 
TRAINING (years) 0.7 0.3 
AGE (years) 28.5 28.7 
UNIONIZED W 52.8 51.8 
JOBTENURE (weeks) 116.7 115.7 
ONSEARCH W 32.8 26.3 
FLXWAGE W 43.5 39.1 
FLXINDUS w 62.1 48.2 
FLXOCCUP w 58.8 45.8 
D (DURATION) (weeks) 24.1 35.4 
SPOUSEY W 13.6 47.2 
SAVINGS W 76.4 69.7 
OTHERY W 7.3 8.4 
NXEMP (weeks) 40.6 46.8 
MARITAL W 46.0 53.0 
FLXPART w 7.0 7.6 
FAMILY SIZE (per earner) 0.6 1.1 
W t ($1971) (weekly) 128.94 90.42 
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Le taux de salaire d'acceptation 
sur les marchés du travail au Canada 
L'article étudie les exigences salariales des chômeurs en quête de travail à partir 
de la théorie de la recherche d'emploi, laquelle soutient que le chômage est un inves-
tissement productif pour les individus. Cette théorie tend à démontrer que les imper-
fections des marchés du travail génèrent tout un éventail de taux de salaires pour un 
type donné de qualification et qu'il serait payant pour un chômeur de ne pas accepter 
automatiquement la première offre salariale qui se présente, mais d'en rechercher 
une qui soit plus appropriée. Cependant, cette recherche ne peut se prolonger indéfi-
niment parce qu'elle coûte quelque chose. Pour maximiser ses revenus, le chercheur 
d'emploi doit ajuster le gain qu'il escompte obtenir au coût de la recherche addition-
nelle. L'offre salariale qui marque ce point d'équilibre se définit sous le nom de taux 
de salaire d'acceptation. La théorie de la recherche d'emploi soutient que les indivi-
dus se comportent comme s'ils connaissaient la notion du salaire d'acceptation qu'ils 
espèrent, soit le refus d'offres salariales inférieures au salaire d'acceptation et l'ac-
quiescement à un salaire dont le taux lui est égal ou supérieur. Le salaire d'accepta-
tion représente donc la demande salariale du travailleur ou ses exigences salariales, et 
les deux expressions sont synonymes. Si l'on peut découvrir que les individus se com-
portent de façon à obtenir le salaire d'acceptation, on aura réussi à démontrer que la 
recherche est valable comme explication théorique du chômage. Ainsi, l'objet pre-
mier de la présente étude est de vérifier de façon empirique l'hypothèse du salaire 
d'acceptation. 
Le deuxième objectif de l'article consiste à examiner l'influence du salaire d'ac-
ceptation sur la durée du chômage. L'une des questions qui revient constamment, 
tant dans la théorie que dans la pratique économiques, c'est la nature des ajuste-
ments économiques que les chômeurs sont disposés à accepter afin d'obtenir du tra-
vail. On présente souvent le marché du travail comme exemple d'un marché d'une 
rare rigidité en matière d'ajustements des taux de salaires à la baisse. Nous exami-
nons ces ajustements de salaires au fur et à mesure que la durée du chômage s'allon-
ge. Ceci sera fait pour différents groupes de travailleurs et dans des conditions de 
marché différentes. Les travailleurs à bas salaire sont placés dans une catégorie diffé-
rente de ceux qui reçoivent des salaires plus élevés. Le cas des travailleurs syndiqués 
est considéré à part de ceux qui ne le sont pas. Les écarts dans les taux de chômage 
sont utilisés comme indice pour identifier les divers états du marché du travail. 
Les données proviennent d'une enquête sur la main-d'oeuvre du ministère de 
l'Industrie et du Commerce pour l'année 1978. Cette enquête englobe les individus 
de diverses localités, individus qui ont été mis à pied ou qui ont abandonné volontai-
rement leur emploi à la suite de la fermeture d'un établissement ou de la diminution 
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de la production. Les équipes d'enquêteurs ont recueilli la liste de ces personnes 
auprès des employeurs dans les localités choisies et elles ont fait des efforts pour ren-
contrer chacune de ces personnes. On leur a demandé d'indiquer leurs expériences de 
travail et de chômage pendant la période de 1973 à 1978. Puisque la théorie de la 
recherche insiste sur la nature volontaire du chômage, on a vérifié les implications de 
la théorie à l'aide de données sur les périodes de chômage où le travailleur avait déci-
dé de son propre chef d'abandonner le travail. 
Les constatations que l'on a faites relativement aux taux de salaires postérieurs 
aux périodes de chômage sont utilisées pour estimer la fonction du salaire d'accepta-
tion en deux étapes. En premier lieu, on a tenté de déterminer pour chaque individu 
le salaire qu'il escomptait obtenir en tenant compte pour chacun des caractéristiques 
du marché du travail. En deuxième lieu, le taux de salaire qu'on escomptait obtenir 
tient compte de variables qui représentent le coût de la recherche pour établir le taux 
de salaire d'acceptation. En accord avec l'hypothèse de la théorie de la recherche, 
plus le salaire escompté est élevé, plus le taux de salaire d'acceptation augmente, 
alors que plus le coût de la recherche s'accroît, plus le taux de salaire d'acceptation 
baisse. 
Ces prévisions sont d'ailleurs confirmées par les vérifications empiriques qu'on 
a faites tant chez les hommes que chez les femmes: le salaire escompté élève le salaire 
d'acceptation et les coûts de la recherche l'abaissent. En d'autres termes, les indivi-
dus se comportent comme s'ils avaient une idée du taux de salaire d'acceptation. 
Cette constatation indique que le comportement de ces individus en chômage est 
caractérisé par la recherche d'un emploi meilleur plus que par la recherche d'un em-
ploi quelconque. Étant donné le taux de salaire qu'ils espèrent obtenir, les individus 
exercent un certain contrôle sur la durée de leur chômage. Si la durée du chômage 
était entièrement fonction de la disponibilité des emplois, il y aurait un rapport signi-
ficatif entre le salaire d'acceptation et le salaire escompté et, d'autre part, l'on n'au-
rait pas noté le coût de la recherche de travail. Ainsi, les résultats obtenus laissent-ils 
voir qu'une part du chômage au moins est attribuable aux délais dans l'acceptation 
d'un emploi. 
Pour ce qui est de la flexibilité, on a constaté que le salaire d'acceptation décroît 
à mesure que la durée du chômage augmente. Cependant, cette flexibilité à la baisse 
est très faible — la baisse étant d'à peine .12 pour cent par mois (en termes réels). Si 
le salaire d'acceptation était de $120.00 par semaine (en termes réels au début de la 
période de recherche), il déclinerait (pour une moyenne de 24 semaines) de .72 pour 
cent ou, approximativement, de $1.00, ce qui est vraiment un très faible déclin. On 
note un degré plus marqué de flexibilité à la baisse si on considère des travailleurs 
dont les salaires sont plus élevés (une rémunération supérieure à $150.00). Pour les 
hommes, elle est de .36 pour cent par mois et pour les femmes de .80 pour cent par 
mois. Pour les travailleurs dont le salaire est plus bas (des salaires inférieurs à 
$150.00 par semaine), le degré de flexibilité n'est pas significatif. Les résultats indi-
quent aussi que, pour les travailleurs syndiqués, il y a un déclin quelque peu plus pro-
noncé du salaire d'acceptation (.20 pour les hommes et .16 pour les femmes) que 
pour les travailleurs non syndiqués pour qui le déclin est sans signification. On a éga-
lement découvert qu'un mauvais climat économique, marqué par des taux de chô-
mage élevés, s'accompagne de taux de déclin plus forts. 
